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In this article we develop a theoretical framework to explain values-based rivalry between activists and firms by integrating and advancing key insights from competitive
dynamics and social activist research. The first part of our framework conceptualizes
the unique tensions, actions, and responses that characterize values-based rivalry
and distinguish it from rivalry between firms. The second part of our framework
conceptualizes the role of managers’ perceptions in shaping their firms’ likelihood of
responding to activists’ actions during values-based rivalry. Overall, our conceptualization primarily expands competitive dynamics research to account for rivalry
between dissimilar actors and, in doing so, broadens social activist research to account
for such rivalry.

shape supply chains and industry norms (Waldron,
Fisher, & Navis, 2015).
Competitive dynamics research has recently
begun to examine rivalry between activists and
firms. Scholars have explored the empirical features of such rivalry (Pacheco & Dean, 2015),
without elaborating its theoretical foundations.
We consequently know little about the unique
tensions, actions, and responses that characterize
rivalry between activists and firms or the factors
that trigger firms’ responses to activists’ actions.
Our purpose is to develop a framework that addresses these explanatory constraints, distinguishes rivalry between activists and firms from
rivalry between firms, and informs richer exploration of this phenomenon. The importance of
developing this framework rests on the growing
prevalence and impact of rivalry between activists and firms (Guay, Doh, & Sinclair, 2004; Hendry,
2005; Waldron, 2011), as well as calls for competitive dynamics research to account for rivalry
between dissimilar actors (Chen & Miller, 2012,
2015; Markman et al., 2016).

Rivalry between activists and firms arises
when activists press firms to adopt more socially
responsible practices and firms look to mitigate
the impact of such efforts on their market advantages (Markman, Waldron, & Panagopoulos,
2016). For instance, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals and Jimmy’s Famous Seafood—a
local seafood restaurant in Baltimore, Maryland—
engaged in a “war of words” over how Jimmy’s
prepared marine animals for consumption, with
each side trading blows and refusing to back
down. Such rivalry carries significant consequences, such as the stigmatization or sanctification of the combatants, the cultivation or
erosion of status for winners and losers, and the
implementation or preservation of practices that
We thank Cindy Devers for serving thoughtfully, constructively, and supportively as our editor, as well as three anonymous reviewers for their valuable advice throughout the
review process. We also appreciate our colleagues Mike
Pfarrer, Gideon Markman, Allen Amason, Andrew Ward, Ann
Buchholtz, and Scott Graffin for encouraging our effort to develop the interdisciplinary theory proposed in this article.
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Our framework, which integrates and advances
competitive dynamics and social activist research, consists of two parts. The first part of the
framework conceptualizes the tensions, actions,
and responses that characterize rivalry between
activists and firms. We posit that the control and
supremacy sought by activists and firms fuel the
tensions they experience, as well as that claims
and counterclaims constitute the actions and responses through which the two sides engage in
rivalry. The role of values in such tensions, actions, and responses leads us to refer to rivalry
between activists and firms as values-based rivalry. The second part of the framework conceptualizes the role of managers’ perceptions in
shaping their firms’ responses to activists’ claims
during values-based rivalry. We posit that salience, threat, and feasibility perceptions, shaped
by attributes associated with rival activists and
their claims, determine the likelihood that firms’
managers will counter the activists’ claims with
their own.
Our theoretical framework makes three primary contributions to competitive dynamics research, as well as associated contributions to
social activist research. First, in recognizing activists and firms as rivals, our framework accounts for rivalry between dissimilar actors.
Second, in conceptualizing the tensions, actions,
and responses that characterize values-based rivalry, our framework establishes that these core
components of rivalry take different forms during
rivalry between activists and firms than they
do during rivalry between firms. Third, in elaborating the impact of managers’ perceptions—
informed by activist-related attributes—on their
likelihood of responding to activists’ claims, our
framework advances understanding of the role
of managerial cognition in discerning firms’ likelihood of responding to rivals’ actions.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Competitive dynamics research has historically examined rivalrous interactions between
firms (Chen & Miller, 2015). Scholars originally
studied the interplay of rival firms’ competitive
actions as they pursue the same sources of market
advantage (Chen & Miller, 2012), both in product
markets for consumers and in factor markets for
resources (Capron & Chatain, 2008; Chen, 1996;
Markman, Gianiodis, & Buchholtz, 2009). Such
work has recognized that organizational and
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behavioral attributes influence interactions between rival firms as they pursue product- and
factor-market advantages (Chen, 1996; Chen &
Miller, 2012). During product-market rivalry, for
instance, larger firms take more significant and
visible actions than do smaller firms against rivals (Chen & Hambrick, 1995), with the significance and visibility of these actions increasing
total responses from rivals (Chen & MacMillan,
1992). During factor-market rivalry, firms attempt
to secure advantages by cultivating better resources than their rivals and by rendering their
rivals’ extant resources inoperable or inaccessible (Markman et al., 2009).
To establish that rivalry is predicated on human
agency and cognition, a parallel stream of competitive dynamics research has emerged that explores how managers’ perceptions influence their
firms’ actions and responses during rivalry (Chen,
1996). Scholars have identified the tension that
managers perceive to exist with rival firms as an
antecedent of their firms’ responses to the rivals’
actions, identifying a positive correlation between tension and response likelihood (Chen,
Kuo-Hsien, & Tsai, 2007). Tension in this context
“refers to the strain between a focal firm and a
given rival that is likely to result in the firm taking
action against the rival” (Chen et al., 2007: 101).
Actions are “specific and detectable market
moves initiated by a firm, such as introducing a
new product or entering a new market, to erode a
rival’s market share or reduce its anticipated
returns” (Chen & Miller, 2012: 141–142). In turn,
responses are “specific and datable countermoves, prompted by an initial action that a firm
takes to defend or improve its share or profit position in its industry” (Chen & Miller, 2012: 142).
Tensions, actions, and responses constitute the
core components of rivalry and are of central interest in our framework.
We interpret tension to be necessary—yet insufficient by itself—to lead managers to respond
to actions by their rivals. The conversion of tension into response may be predicated on awareness, motivation, and capability (AMC), which
play important, interconnected roles in explaining managers’ response likelihood during rivalry
(Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 2007; Chen & Miller, 1994).
Although scholars have conceptualized AMC in
various ways, they have typically focused on
managers’ awareness of rivals and their own
firms’ motivation and capability to respond to the
rivals’ actions (Chen, 1996; Chen & Miller, 1994,
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2012). Managers become more likely to respond to
rivals as, informed by evaluations of rival-related
attributes, they recognize rivals and their actions
(awareness), see net benefits associated with response (motivation), and believe their firms possess adequate ability to respond (capability; cf.
Chen, 1996; Chen & Miller, 1994). In shaping their
firms’ responses to rivals’ actions, managers’
AMC provides a catalyst to transform tension into
response—a premise that informs the development of our framework. Implicit is that managers
can perceive tension with rivals in the presence
or absence of action against their firms, whereas AMC hinges on managers’ evaluations of the
implications of rivals’ actions for their firms.
Departing from attention to rivalry between
firms, scholars have begun to explore rivalry between activists and firms. During such rivalry,
activists press for firms to adopt more socially
responsible practices, and firms look to mitigate
the impact of such efforts on their market advantages (Markman et al., 2016). Rivalry between activists and firms has grown in prevalence and
impact (Guay et al., 2004; Hendry, 2005; Waldron,
2011), occurring between diverse actors and producing diverse consequences for the combatants.
In initial competitive dynamics research on this
phenomenon, like in early competitive dynamics
research on interfirm rivalry, scholars have examined select empirical correlates of practice
change by firms—the focal outcome of rivalry
with activists. For instance, Markman et al. (2016)
proposed that strategic aggressiveness influences how readily firms enact the practice change
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sought by activists. Similarly, Pacheco and Dean
(2015) found that market dependence and competitor behavior shape firms’ adoption of the
practice change sought by activists. Table 1 provides examples of the rivalry between activists
and firms considered in such work.
Despite their attentiveness to empirical connections between the features and outcomes of
rivalry between activists and firms, competitive
dynamics scholars have not established the theoretical foundations of this phenomenon. Extant
work does not conceptualize the tensions, actions,
and responses that characterize such rivalry,
which, because of differences between activists
and firms, may look distinct from those that
characterize rivalry between firms. It also does
not conceptualize the nature of managers’ perceptions, the factors that shape these perceptions,
or the impact of such perceptions on their firms’
likelihood of responding to activists’ actions; instead, it attends to the outcome of such rivalry and
leaves the catalyst that transforms tension into
response unspecified. Our objective is to develop
a framework that resolves these explanatory
constraints, establishes the theoretical foundations of rivalry between activists and firms, and
provides a richer understanding of such rivalry.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Our framework synthesizes and extends research from the competitive dynamics and social
activist domains. The core premise of our framework is that tension precedes firms’ responses to

TABLE 1
Examples of Rivalry Between Activists and Firms
Activist

Firm

Focus

Duration

Winner

RAN

Weyerhaeuser

6 years

Weyerhaeuser

Oxfam

Starbuck’s

2 years

Oxfam

PETA

KFC

17 years

KFC

Friends of the Earth

Ace Hardware

3 years

Ace

Greenpeace

Trader Joe’s

2 years

Greenpeace

GLAAD

New York Times

Procurement of wood from ancient, oldgrowth forests
Wages paid to coffee farmers in
impoverished countries
Treatment of chickens raised on
suppliers’ farms
Sale of garden products containing
neonic pesticides
Sale of fish harvested in unsustainable
ways
Use of derogatory terms for
homosexuality

, 1 year

GLAAD

Note: We selected examples where activist organizations and firms engaged in rivalry for clarity of illustration. However, our
theory pertains to activists of any form—ranging from individuals to social movements—engaged in rivalry with firms.
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rivals’ actions, with firm managers’ perceptions of
rivals and their actions catalyzing the conversion
of tension into response. We build on this premise
to conceptualize the tensions, actions, and responses that characterize rivalry between activists and firms, as well as the role of managers’
perceptions in shaping their firms’ likelihood of
responding to activists’ actions. To develop our
theory, we build on research from the various
domains that have traditionally researched social activism against firms (e.g., social movements, institutions, stakeholders, and nonmarket
strategy)—described henceforth as social activist
research. Drawing on social activist research to
enrich the competitive dynamics domain bolsters
the capacity of both domains to explain rivalry
between activists and firms, honoring calls to
engage in interdisciplinary theory development
(Durand, Grant, & Madsen, 2017).
Tensions, Actions, and Responses During Rivalry
Between Activists and Firms
The first part of our framework conceptualizes
the tensions, actions, and responses that characterize rivalry between activists and firms (Chen &
Miller, 2012). We establish that these core components of rivalry take different forms during rivalry between activists and firms than they do
during rivalry between firms. Our framework
elaborates the unique sources of tension for activists and firms, contrasting the forms of control
and supremacy sought by firms with those sought
by activists and firms. It also elaborates the
unique actions and responses through which activists and firms engage in rivalry, contrasting
such actions and responses with those used by
firms to engage in rivalry.
Sources of tension for activists and firms. According to competitive dynamics research, firms
experience tension when they seek control over
the same consumers and resources, as well as
supremacy in common product and factor markets (Chen et al., 2007). Implicit is that such tension
hinges on the potential implications of (not) winning these battles for competitive positioning, financial performance, and operational integrity.
Competitive dynamics research has also recognized the object of rivalry between activists and
firms—namely, the nature and implications of the
firms’ practices for society and the environment
(Markman et al., 2016). However, such work has
offered much less insight about the tension
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underpinning battles over these practices,
which, relative to rivalry between firms, may
emanate from the desire for control of a different
form and supremacy in a different context.
Social activist research tells us that activists
and firms seek to control firms’ practices for acquiring consumers, accessing resources, and using resources, among others (den Hond & de
Bakker, 2007). Whereas rival firms seek to control
common “objects” (e.g., consumers and resources),
rival activists and firms seek to control “behaviors”
for interacting with those common objects (e.g.,
practices for accessing resources). Activists seek
to control firms’ practices that create negative
social or environmental externalities and/or violate moral standards (cf. Frooman, 1999; Markman
et al., 2016). In turn, firms seek to preserve control
of their practices that play key roles in their operations and that contribute to their advantages
relative to competing firms (Markman et al., 2016).
PETA and Jimmy’s Seafood, for instance, sought
to control how Jimmy’s prepared shellfish and
other marine animals for consumption.
As they seek control over practices, activists
and firms may also seek supremacy in values domains. Values domains describe sociocognitive
markets (cf. Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989;
Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton, & Kanfer, 1995),
which transcend the boundaries between product
and factor markets and broader society, where
various actors look to establish the dominance of
their values. Actors cognitively and socially construct the boundaries and features of values domains through observation and interaction with
each other, much like firms define product and
factor markets (cf. Porac et al., 1995). These interactions facilitate the dissemination and acceptance of values such that greater acceptance
throughout values domains corresponds to the
heightened dominance of actors’ values and
the elevation of their social positions in values
domains. Actors that achieve these outcomes
receive an array of social advantages, such as
improved reputations, gained power and influence, higher valuation, and better access to resources (French, Raven, & Cartwright, 1959;
Podolny, 1993). When activists and firms seek supremacy in values domains, then, they seek to
ensure the dominance of their values, enhance
their social positions, and accrue the social advantages associated with these positions. PETA
and Jimmy’s Seafood, for instance, sought to secure broader acceptance of the values associated
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with their respective stances on Jimmy’s treatment of marine animals.
Analogous to tension between rival firms, tension between rival activists and firms hinges
on the interconnected implications of (not) securing the control over practices and supremacy in
values domains sought by activists and firms.
Winning control over practices signifies the
dominance of the winners’ values to the actors
comprising values domains, providing the impetus for these actors to accept the winners’ values
and elevate their social standing. Conversely,
winning supremacy in values domains comes
with social advantages, including support from
actors in those settings, that may increase the
winners’ influence during efforts to control rivals’
practices. Implicit here is that activists’ and firms’
values inform and are reflected in their actions
and responses during rivalry, a premise we
elaborate on in more length in the next section.
The preceding logic indicates that the potential
implications of controlling practices and gaining
supremacy in values domains, as well as the interplay between these pursuits, constitute the
unique sources of tension experienced by rival
activists and firms. Given the fundamental role
that values play in rivalry between activists
and firms, we refer to such rivalry as valuesbased rivalry.
Nature of actions and responses by activists
and firms. According to competitive dynamics
research, actions and responses between rival
firms entail tactics for controlling the resources
and consumers necessary to attain supremacy
in product and factor markets, including product introductions, advertising campaigns, market
entry, pricing changes, and facility redesigns/
relocations, among others (Chen & MacMillan,
1992; Chen & Miller, 2012; Smith, Grimm, Wally,
& Young, 1997). Without mentioning actions and
responses, competitive dynamics research on
activist-firm rivalry has described activists’ tactics for influencing firms and has not addressed
the mechanisms of influence or the tactics that
firms use in response, instead attending to an
outcome of such rivalry—practice change likelihood (Markman et al., 2016).
Social activist research may help to elucidate
the unique nature of the actions and responses
taken by activists and firms to control common
practices. Scholars have recognized that activists
make claims through visible demonstration tactics (e.g., advertisements, press releases, protests,
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boycotts, and shareholder proposals) that contest
target firms’ practices (Briscoe & Gupta, 2016).
In harnessing various frames (Briscoe, Gupta, &
Anner, 2015), rhetorical arguments (Waldron et al.,
2015), and logics (York, Hargrave, & Pacheco,
2016) to stigmatize firms in public arenas, activists’ claims threaten firms’ reputations, potentially constraining their access to consumers and
resources of competitive importance (Baron &
Diermeier, 2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Frooman,
1999; McDonnell & King, 2013; Waldron, Navis,
& Fisher, 2013). Potential reputational harm and
its consequences pressure firms to cede control
over their practices (Waldron et al., 2013). When
faced with such pressure, firms counter such
claims with their own to mitigate the potential
effect of activists’ claims on their reputations and
the associated pressure to cede control of their
practices (Coupland, 2005).1 PETA and Jimmy’s
Seafood, for instance, publicly exchanged claims
and counterclaims as they pursued control over
Jimmy’s seafood preparation practices.
Claims may also constitute the means through
which activists and firms pursue supremacy in
values domains. Values inform and are reflected
in the content of activists’ claims and firms’
counterclaims (cf. Benford & Snow, 2000; den Hond
& de Bakker, 2007; Waldron et al., 2015), with the
link between values and claims varying across
organizations and claims (cf. Waldron et al., 2013).
As activists’ and firms’ values more strongly inform their claims and counterclaims, the claims
may more strongly reflect the two sides’ values,
signifying these values to other actors in values
domains. The signification of values in claims
enables activists and firms to jockey for the
acceptance of their values and the conferral
of favorable social standing by the actors in
values domains, as well as the social advantages
associated with these outcomes. Given their
roles in controlling practices and gaining supremacy in values domains, claims constitute the
unique “actions” and “responses” that characterize values-based rivalry between activists and
firms. PETA’s and Jimmy’s Seafood’s claims and

1
Counterclaims constitute firms’ responses to activists’
claims during rivalry, whereas practice change by firms—or
lack thereof—constitutes an outcome of such rivalry. Given
our interest in the former, our theory focuses on scenarios
where activists’ claims incite firms’ counterclaims, rather than
scenarios where activists’ claims immediately lead firms to
change their practices.
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counterclaims, for instance, were informed by
their respective values and signified these values
to other actors.
To recap, the first part of our framework established the foundational components of rivalry
between activists and firms, attending to the
tensions and actions characterizing such battles.
In terms of tension, as activists and firms seek
control over common practices, they may also be
seeking supremacy in values domains. We consequently refer to this phenomenon as valuesbased rivalry. In terms of action, we propose that
activists and firms battle to control the latter’s
practices and to secure supremacy in values domains through claims and counterclaims.
Managerial Perception and Firm Response
Likelihood During Rivalry With Activists
The second part of our framework conceptualizes the role of managers’ perceptions in shaping
their firms’ likelihood of responding to rival activists’ claims with their own, specifying the catalyst that converts the latent tension experienced
by firms into response during values-based rivalry. Although values factor prominently into the
tensions, actions, and responses that characterize
rivalry between activists and firms, they play a
lesser role in catalyzing firms’ counterclaims to
activists’ claims. The complexities associated
with understanding activists and their claims
may require firms’ managers to draw on a diverse
set of perceptual lenses that play more direct
and explicit roles than their firms’ values in
shaping the managers’ perceptions of, and associated counterclaims to, rival activists’ claims.
We consequently identify the perceptions that
characterize managerial sensemaking during
values-based rivalry and link these perceptions
to extant conceptions of AMC. We then elucidate the interconnected roles of managers’ perceptions in determining their firms’ likelihood of
responding to activists’ claims through counterclaims. We conclude by elucidating how attributes associated with activists and their claims
inform managers’ perceptions. Figure 1 illustrates the second part of our framework.
Managers’ perceptions of rival activists. According to competitive dynamics research, firms
become more likely to respond to rivals’ actions
as their managers become more aware, motivated, and capable of dealing with their rivals
(Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 2007; Chen & Miller, 1994).
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Notably, the AMC perspective on firms’ response
likelihood has not been extended to competitive
dynamics research on rivalry between activists
and firms. Such work has more descriptively
recognized that firms with market dependencies
and first-mover tendencies are more likely to
change as sought by activists (Markman et al.,
2016; Pacheco & Dean, 2015). It has thus overlooked
the fundamental impact of managerial cognition
on the exchanges that make up such rivalry
(i.e., claims/counterclaims), instead attending to
the empirical determinants of an outcome of such
rivalry (i.e., practice change).
Social activist research provides further insight
into what managers’ sensemaking efforts entail
and how they influence their firms’ likelihood
of responding to activists during values-based
rivalry. Waldron et al. (2013) posited that the
likelihood firms will adopt the practice change
sought by activists corresponds to firm managers’
perceptions of the threat posed by activists such
that change likelihood increases with perceived
threat. According to Waldron et al.’s theory,
managers’ threat evaluations consider two factors: the potential reputational impact of the activists’ efforts on their firms and the importance
of the practices contested by the activists to
their firms. Managers are more likely to perceive
threats from activists that appear to harm their
firms’ reputations, with these perceived threats
becoming more salient as managers believe the
contested practices more reflect their firms’ defining qualities. Overall, despite holding constant
the external factors associated with activists’
efforts that may influence managers’ perceptions and focusing on practice change by firms,
Waldron et al.’s (2013) theory identifies some key
managerial perceptions of relevance to firm response likelihood.
This theoretical account provides a starting
point to link the traditional conceptions of managerial AMC to the managerial perceptions at play
during values-based rivalry. First, managers’
threat perceptions constitute their motivation for
responding to activists’ claims. Our framework
thus focuses on managers’ perceptions of the
threat posed by activists. Second, for managers to
determine the threat posed by activists, they must
be aware of the activists and designate them as
salient. Awareness constitutes a cognitive precondition for managers to gauge the salience
of activists to their firms. Our framework thus
focuses on managers’ perceptions of activists’

Activist disruptiveness
P5
Activist
support
P6

P2

Signifies relationships where one construct
affects another

Diagnostic
reach
P9

Activists’ diagnostic claim attributes

Diagnostic
tone
P8

Perceived threat
(motivation)

How much pressure are the activists
placing on firms’ reputations?

Diagnostic
focus
P7

Signifies relationships where one construct
precedes, but does not affect, another

Activists’ influence attributes

Activist
effectiveness
P4

Perceived salience
(awareness)

How urgent, powerful, and
legitimate are the activists?

Prognostic
alignment
P11

Activists’ prognostic claim attributes

Prognostic
scope
P10

Perceived feasibility
(capability)

P3

P1

Can firms change in ways
desired by the activists?

FIGURE 1
Activists’ Claims, Managers’ Perceptions, and Firms’ Response Likelihood

Response likelihood
(counterclaims)
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salience. Third and finally, social activist research does not explicitly conceptualize capability as a facet of managerial sensemaking. Such
work assumes that, given their resource endowments, firms can enact the practice changes
sought by activists (Waldron et al., 2013). However, consistent with managers’ perceptions of
response capability during rivalry with other
firms, managers also gauge such capability during rivalry with activists. Managers gauge the
feasibility of enacting the practice change sought
by activists (cf. Schwartz, 2010), in part to determine whether they should counter the activists’
claims with their own. The distinction between
capability and feasibility is that capability deals
with idealistic perceptions of response capacity, whereas feasibility deals with realistic perceptions of response capacity. Our framework
focuses on managers’ feasibility perceptions.
Impact of managers’ perceptions on firms’
likelihood of responding to rival activists. Our
contention is that managers’ salience, threat, and
feasibility perceptions—hallmarks of managerial
sensemaking during values-based rivalry—play
distinct and interconnected roles in shaping their
firms’ likelihood of responding to activists’ claims
with their own. Competitive dynamics research
offers little precedent to explain these roles. Extant work has recognized that the confluence of
managers’ AMC perceptions explains firms’ likelihood of responding to rivals, without exploring
or explaining the interplay of each perceptual
dimension and the implications for response
likelihood. Social activist research offers more
insight, since it emphasizes the direct effect of
managers’ perceptions of activists as threats on
their likelihood of changing practices in response
to activists’ efforts (Waldron et al., 2013). This effect translates to our account of response likelihood, leading us to suggest that managers’ threat
perceptions influence their likelihood of countering activists’ claims during values-based rivalry.
Of note is that these threat perceptions may influence whether firms act on the latent tension
they perceive to exist with activists. Building on
the preceding logic, we propose the following.
Proposition 1: Managers’ threat perceptions positively relate to their firms’
response likelihood during valuesbased rivalry.
Additionally, social activist research recognizes that managerial salience perceptions are
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interwoven with the threat-response link such
that managers perceive more salient threats as
activists contest practices of greater importance
to their firms (Waldron et al., 2013). However,
managers may more instinctively and immediately consider external factors, such as the reputations of rival activists, when determining the
salience of the activists to their firms (Pacheco,
York, & Hargrave, 2014). Implicit here is that
managers may deem activists to be worthy of their
attention, a correlate of salience (cf. Nigam &
Ocasio, 2010), before designating the activists as
threats. Moreover, managers’ perceptions of activists’ salience do not directly affect their firms’
likelihood of countering activists’ claims, instead providing the impetus for the managers to
cultivate the threat perceptions that influence
such response likelihood. Specifically, managers become more likely to consider the threat
posed by activists as they assign more salience
to them. Of note is that salience perceptions
may influence managers’ attention to and consideration of the latent tension they perceive to
exist with activists. We therefore propose the
following.
Proposition 2: Managers’ salience perceptions precede and catalyze their
efforts to make sense of threats from
activists during values-based rivalry.
Finally, although not explicitly addressed by
social activist research, managers are likely to
gauge the feasibility of practice change as they
consider the threat from activists and before
deciding to respond through counterclaims (cf.
Schwartz, 2010). Managers’ efforts to gauge feasibility are interwoven with, rather than catalyzed
by, their efforts to gauge the threat posed by activists (cf. Dutton & Duncan, 1987). The feasibility
of practice change, or lack thereof, may influence
managers’ baseline tendency to respond to
threats from activists, rather than directly influence this response tendency. Whereas perceiving
activists to be noteworthy threats does motivate
managers to respond, perceiving the practice
change demanded by activists to be feasible does
not provide such motivation. At the same time,
perceiving practice change to be feasible leads
managers to feel more empowered to counter the
activists’ claims with their own claims. Knowing that change is feasible may mitigate the
perceived risk associated with making counterclaims, regardless of the content of those claims,
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amplifying managers’ likelihood of responding
to perceived threats. Notable here is that feasibility perceptions may play a supplementary role
in converting the latent tension managers perceive to exist with activists into responses to activists’ claims. Thus, we posit the following.
Proposition 3: Managers’ feasibility
perceptions positively moderate the
relationship between their threat perceptions and response likelihood during values-based rivalry.
Activist-related attributes that shape managers’ perceptions. Having conceptualized how
managers’ salience, threat, and feasibility perceptions shape their likelihood of responding to
activists’ claims, there remains an unanswered
question about the external factors that shape
each of these perceptions. Competitive dynamics
research offers little direct insight here since
it focuses on firm-related factors that are not relevant for managers to evaluate during rivalry
with activists. Social activist research has emphasized internal factors, such as firms’ defining
qualities, that shape managers’ efforts to make
sense of activists’ impact on their firms’ reputations (McDonnell & King, 2013; Waldron et al.,
2013). Such work has not addressed the external
factors—notably, activist-related attributes—that
managers consider during their sensemaking
efforts or the mechanisms through which these
attributes influence managers’ perceptions.
In the remainder of this section, we elucidate
these proposed connections between activistrelated attributes and managerial perceptions
during values-based rivalry, discerning these
attributes from prior theoretical explanations
and empirical findings in competitive dynamics
and social activist research. This facet of our
conceptualization is guided by the premise that
managers’ perceptions of rival firms are predicated on evaluations of the attributes of the rivals
and their actions (Chen & Miller, 2012, 2015). We
attend to analogous attributes—those associated
with rival activists and their claims—that managers consider during values-based rivalry. Our
theory posits that key attributes associated with
activists’ reputed influence, their diagnostic
claims, and their prognostic claims inform managers’ salience, threat, and feasibility perceptions, respectively, during values-based rivalry.
Activists’ influence and salience perceptions.
Managers’ evaluations of activists’ influence may
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inform their perceptions of the activists’ salience.
Both competitive dynamics and social activist
research have shown that firms are more likely to
respond to rivals possessing the means to inflict
harm on their firms (e.g., Boyd & Bresser, 2008;
Chen & Miller, 1994; Chen, Smith, & Grimm, 1992;
Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Lenox & Eesley, 2009). Embedded in these effects is the premise that firms
attribute more salience to rivals that could potentially influence them. We contend that managers’
perceptions of salience during values-based rivalry hinge on evaluations of rival activists’ potential to influence their firms such that managers
attribute more salience to activists who appear to
carry more influence. What managers know about
activists’ efforts and achievements during prior
rivalry against their firms or others informs immediate and instinctive assessments of how noteworthy the activists are to their firms.
Managers may evaluate three reputational attributes, informed by media coverage or personal
experience, to approximate the rival activists’ potential influence—namely, their historical effectiveness, disruptiveness, and support in catalyzing
practice change by prior rival firms. Basically,
managers determine activists’ potential to influence their firms by evaluating information on the
activists’ historical effectiveness, disruptiveness,
and support. Of interest to our conceptualization
is how evaluations of these three attributes
uniquely shape managers’ perceptions of the activists’ power, urgency, and legitimacy, contributing to their overall perceptions of the activists’
salience (cf. Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997).
Activists’ effectiveness describes managers’
evaluations of activists’ historical proficiency in
catalyzing practice change by firms. Neither
competitive dynamics research nor social activist
research has offered much overt insight into how
rivals’ proficiency in this regard influences managers’ sensemaking efforts. However, scholars
have reported that prior interactions increase
rival firms’ attention to each other (Kilduff,
Elfenbein, & Staw, 2010). This effect may intensify for firms that have performed worse than, or
even lost to, their rivals during prior interactions
and may weaken for firms that have performed
better than, or even won against, rivals. Outcomes of prior interactions provide managers
with information on their rivals’ power such
that more unfavorable outcomes contribute to perceptions that rivals are more powerful. That is,
believing rivals have beaten or influenced their
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firms or other firms in some way—namely, that
rivals have been effective in their efforts—leads
managers to believe that the rivals are more powerful than their own firms and, consequently, worthy of attention. This logic indicates that managers
may evaluate activists’ effectiveness during prior
rivalry with their firms or other firms to gauge the
powerfulness of the activists’ current efforts, contributing to the managers’ overall perceptions of
the activists’ salience. Activists appear to be more
powerful—and, consequently, more salient—
rivals when managers perceive the activists to
have been more proficient historically in catalyzing
practice change by firms. Building on this logic, we
propose the following.
Proposition 4: Managers’ perceptions of
activists’ effectiveness positively relate
to their perceptions of the activists’
salience.
Activists’ disruptiveness describes managers’
evaluations of the severity of the impact that activists have historically had on rival firms’ operations. Whereas effectiveness deals with the
outcomes that activists appear to have achieved
during prior rivalry, disruptiveness deals with the
impediments that activists appear to have generated when such rivalry was ongoing. Competitive dynamics research has reported that firms
consider the adverse social and economic impact of rival firms’ actions on their firms (Chen
& Miller, 2012; Chen et al., 1992; MacMillan,
McCaffery, & Van Wijk, 1985). Social activist research has proffered that activists’ efforts impede
firms’ operations (Baron & Diermeier, 2007; Eesley
& Lenox, 2006; Frooman, 1999; King, 2008; King &
Soule, 2007). Our conception of actions and responses recognizes that activists’ repertoires of
claims, along with the demonstration tactics for
disseminating them, during prior rivalry may inform managers’ evaluations of how severely the
activists could impact their firms’ operations
during ongoing rivalry. Managers may evaluate
how activists have engaged prior rival firms,
embodied in impressions of the activists’ repertoire of claims and tactics, to gauge how much
impact the activists had on those firms and how
much impact the activists could have on their own
firms. Notably, managers’ evaluations of activists’ historical disruptiveness may rely on their
general impressions, rather than specific knowledge, of the nature and impact of activists’ behavioral tendencies during prior rivalry.
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We contend that activists’ disruptiveness during prior rivalry may contribute to managers’
perceptions of the activists’ salience to their firms
during ongoing rivalry. Whereas the outcomes of
activists’ prior rivalry with firms enables managers to gauge the power of their rivals, the severity of the impact on firms during such rivalry
enables managers to gauge the urgency of their
rivals. Competitive dynamics research has reported that firms tend to respond faster as rivals
appear to be poised to impact their operations
more broadly and deeply (Chen & Miller, 2012).
This effect may implicitly hinge on the tendency
for managers to perceive more disruptive rivals
as more urgent concerns, as reflected in their
heightened response speed. Adapting this logic
to managers’ evaluations of rival activists’ disruptiveness suggests that managers may perceive activists to be more urgent rivals as the
activists appear to have been more disruptive
during prior rivalry. When activists appear to
have been more historically disruptive to firms,
managers anticipate analogous disruptions to
their firms and perceive the activists to be more
urgent—and, consequently, more salient—rivals.
In contrast, as activists appear to have been less
historically disruptive to firms, managers anticipate an analogous lack of disruption to their firms
and perceive the activists to be less urgent—and,
consequently, less salient—rivals. Building on
the preceding logic, we propose the following.
Proposition 5: Managers’ perceptions
of activists’ disruptiveness positively
relate to their perceptions of the activists’ salience.
Activists’ support describes managers’ evaluations of the pervasiveness of the collective action
that activists have historically mobilized against
rival firms. Though not of interest in competitive
dynamics research, social activist research has
long emphasized the importance of collective action to activists’ efforts (Briscoe & Gupta, 2016).
Such work posits that, to overcome resource constraints, activists attempt to mobilize broad and
diverse support for their efforts against firms
(Bartley & Child, 2011; King, 2008; Walker, Martin,
& McCarthy, 2008). The extent of collective action
mobilized by activists may reflect their broader
social acceptance such that activists appear more
legitimate when they appear to mobilize more
pervasive collective action. Managers may consequently evaluate activists’ support during prior
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rivalry with their own firms or others to gauge the
broader legitimacy of the activists’ efforts, which
contributes to managers’ overall perceptions of
the activists’ salience (cf. Mitchell et al., 1997).
Activists appear to be a more legitimate—and,
consequently, a more salient—concern to managers as the managers perceive the activists to
have historically mobilized more extensive collective action against rival firms. Such managerial perceptions may emanate from evidence of
support for the rival activists, such as when celebrities endorse the activists’ efforts or the activists reference such support in their claims (cf.
Waldron et al., 2015). Building on this logic, we
propose the following.
Proposition 6: Managers’ perceptions
of activists’ support positively relate
to their perceptions of the activists’
salience.
Activists’ diagnostic claims and threat
perceptions. Whereas evaluations of activists’
reputed influence inform managers’ perceptions
of how much attention to pay to rival activists,
evaluations of activists’ diagnostic claims inform managers’ perceptions of how much threat
they face from the activists. Competitive dynamics researchers have begun to recognize that
managers consider rivals’ claims (Gao, Yu, &
Cannella, 2017; Guo, Yu, & Gimeno, 2017), without attending to the perceptual impact of such
claims or to claims explicitly about their firms.
Somewhat analogously, social activist researchers
have descriptively recognized that activists make
diagnostic and prognostic claims about firms
(Benford & Snow, 2000; Briscoe & Gupta, 2016),
without attending to the unique and direct impact
of each claim type on firm managers’ sensemaking efforts. Our conception of actions and
responses proposes that activists’ claims constitute their actions for engaging in values-based
rivalry with firms. Scholars have recognized that
diagnostic and prognostic claims perform distinct
yet complementary roles during such rivalry
(Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Benford &
Snow, 2000). Diagnostic claims identify problems
with firms’ practices, and prognostic claims
specify desired changes to these practices (cf.
Benford & Snow, 2000).
Because diagnostic claims stigmatize what
firms do in public arenas, they have more potential than prognostic claims to harm firms’ reputations (Briscoe & Gupta, 2016) and, consequently,
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to fuel managers’ perceptions of the activists as
threats (Waldron et al., 2013). That is, the potential
to harm firms’ reputations, which we alternatively
describe as reputational pressure, constitutes the
mechanism through which activists’ diagnostic
claims shape managers’ threat perceptions. Three
attributes of activists’ diagnostic claims—focus,
tone, and reach—may inform managers’ perceptions of the threats posed by the potential impact of
these claims on their firms’ reputations. As with
conceptions of action attributes in competitive
dynamics research (Chen & Miller, 2012), the attributes of activists’ diagnostic claims can apply to
individual claims, repertoires of claims, or (longitudinal) patterns of claims. We presume that the
more managers believe a diagnostic claim attribute applies across these aggregation levels, the
more likely managers are to experience the proposed perceptual effects.
Diagnostic focus describes managers’ evaluations of attributions of blame in activists’ claims
about problems with their firms’ practices—
specifically in terms of who or what causes these
problems. The assumption in social activist research is that, when attempting to harm firms’
reputations, activists blame the firms for problems with their practices (e.g., King & Soule,
2007; McDonnell & King, 2013). Empirical findings
from such work suggest that activists may also
establish how the firms’ managers and industries
contribute to the firms’ problematic behavior
(Waldron et al., 2015). The implication for our
theory is that activists’ diagnostic claims may
blame firms’ individual managers for allowing
such behavior to continue, the firms themselves
for engaging in such behavior, or the industries
where the firms belong for accepting such behavior. The focus of activists’ diagnostic claims,
then, refers to the actors—ranging from individuals to industries—the activists blame for problems with firms’ practices.
We contend that the focus of activists’ diagnostic claims may contribute to managers’
perceptions of the threat posed by these claims.
Competitive dynamics research has reported
that firms are more likely to respond to rivalry
that affects commercial or psychological spaces
of greater importance (Baum & Korn, 1996;
Livengood & Reger, 2010; Pacheco & Dean, 2015).
Managers’ threat perceptions provide the implicit
mechanism to explain this effect—that is, managers perceive more intense threats from rivals
who hit “closer to home” or encroach upon their
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firms’ “home turf” (cf. Livengood & Reger, 2010).
Adapting this logic to managers’ evaluations of
rival activists’ diagnostic claims suggests that
managers may perceive more intense threats
as the activists blame them more individually
for problems with their firms’ practices. More individual diagnostic focus removes ambiguity
around managers’ roles in their firms’ problematic behavior, leading the managers to view
themselves as more responsible for putting their
firms’ reputations at risk and to perceive more
intensive threats from these claims. Moreover,
individual blame makes it challenging for
managers to remain anonymous within their organizations or among other industry members,
reducing their likelihood of avoiding or displacing blame. In contrast, as diagnostic focus
becomes more organizational or industrial, managers perceive themselves as less responsible for
putting their firms’ reputations at risk, more capable of blending in with the collectives being
blamed, and less threatened by these claims.
Building on this logic, we propose the following.
Proposition 7: Managers’ perceptions
of activists’ diagnostic focus influence
their perceptions of the activists as
threats such that threat perceptions intensify as diagnostic focus becomes
more individual.
Diagnostic tone describes managers’ evaluations of the emotion used to problematize their
firms’ practices in activists’ claims. Positive diagnostic claims emphasize the potential benefits
of resolving problems associated with firms’
practices, whereas negative diagnostic claims
emphasize the potential costs associated with
failing to resolve these problems (cf. Aslani, King,
& Foroughi, 2013; Waldron et al., 2015). Social activist researchers have recognized that, to harm
firms’ reputations, activists attempt to stigmatize
firms in public arenas (Baron & Diermeier, 2007;
Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Frooman, 1999; King, 2008;
King & Soule, 2007). Although such stigma can
be created through positive or negative claims
about firms’ practices, negative claims are
more likely to fuel managers’ apprehension that
their firms’ practices will pervasively be viewed
as inappropriate (cf. Jackson & Dutton, 1988;
Waldron et al., 2015). The implication for our
theory is that managers’ evaluations of activists’
diagnostic tone—the emotion used to problematize their firms’ practices—inform managers’
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evaluations of the threats posed by activists such
that more negative claims contribute to greater
perceived threats. We consequently propose the
following.
Proposition 8: Managers’ perceptions of
activists’ diagnostic tone influence their
perceptions of the activists as threats
such that threat perceptions intensify as
claims become more negative in tone.
Diagnostic reach describes managers’ evaluations of the diversity of actors exposed to, affected
by, and interested in activists’ claims about
problems with their firms’ practices. Diagnostic
reach differs from activists’ support in that it deals
with evaluations of potential interest in activists’
ongoing efforts, rather than evaluations of historical support for activists’ prior efforts. Broadreach claims are those managers believe appeal
to heterogeneous actors, whereas narrow-reach
claims are those managers believe appeal to homogeneous actors. Social activist researchers
have recognized that activists’ efforts to harm
their firms’ reputations may create the impression
of collective action, contributing to perceptions
of the activists as threats (Waldron et al., 2013).
Implicit here is that managers may evaluate the
content of activists’ diagnostic claims about their
firms’ practices, such as the logics, frames, and
rhetorical arguments employed, to approximate
the breadth of resonance of their diagnostic
claims. As such, managers’ evaluations of activists’ diagnostic reach—as captured in content
that reflects how broadly their diagnostic claims
resonate—further inform their evaluations of
threats from activists such that claims with
broader reach contribute to greater perceived
threats. This effect hinges on managers’ apprehension that claims with broader reach, relative
to those with narrower reach, are more likely
to spread doubt among other actors about the
appropriateness of their firms’ practices and to
intensify collective action against their firms.
We thus propose the following.
Proposition 9: Managers’ perceptions of
activists’ diagnostic reach influence
their perceptions of the activists as
threats such that threat perceptions intensify as claims become broader in
reach.
Activists’ prognostic claims and feasibility
perceptions. Whereas evaluations of activists’
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diagnostic claims inform managers’ perceptions
of how much threat they face to change, evaluations of activists’ prognostic claims inform managers’ perceptions of how realistic it is to change.
That is, managers may evaluate activists’ prognostic claims, which specify the desired changes
to their firms’ practices, to determine the feasibility of such changes. Neither competitive dynamics nor social activist research has explicitly
accounted for how managers incorporate the
nature of rivals’ prognostic claims into their
sensemaking efforts. However, the essence of
perceptual constructs like capability and feasibility is that firms gauge their capacity to respond to rivals’ actions (Chen, 1996; Chen et al.,
2007). As mentioned, capability deals with ideal
capacity to respond (i.e., everything else held
constant), and feasibility deals with realistic
capacity to respond (i.e., considering practical
constraints).
The implication for our theory is that managers’
perceptions of feasibility hinge on their realistic
capacity to accommodate the practice change
specified in activists’ prognostic claims. Managers assign more feasibility to practice change
that they can enact without causing extreme disruptions, whether economic or social, to their
firms (Howard-Grenville, 2007; York et al., 2016).
It is worth reiterating that managers consider the
feasibility of practice change as part of their effort
to determine whether to counter the activists’
claims with their own such that managers feel
more empowered to respond as change appears
to be more feasible. Managers may evaluate two
attributes of activists’ prognostic claims—scope
and alignment—to approximate the feasibility of
enacting the practice change specified in those
claims. Of interest to our conceptualization is how
evaluations of these two attributes shape managers’ perceptions of the internal costliness and
appropriateness of practice change for their firms,
contributing to their perceptions of the feasibility
of the activists’ demands. Considering the internal costliness of change helps managers to
approximate whether they can change, and attending to the internal appropriateness of change
helps managers to approximate whether they
should change.
Prognostic scope describes managers’ evaluations of the proportion of their firms’ supply chains
affected by the practice change proposed in activists’ claims. Prognostic scope differs from diagnostic reach in that it deals with evaluations of
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the internal impact of change, rather than evaluations of external interest in problems. Prognostic
scope increases as managers deem practice
change to affect greater proportions of their firms’
supply chains. Greater prognostic scope entails
change that spans from the cultivation of raw resources to the provision of offerings, whereas
lesser prognostic scope entails change to isolated
activities. Our attention to prognostic scope emanates from the premise, common to competitive dynamics and social activist research, that
firms consider the resource commitments of
potential courses of action (Chen & MacMillan,
1992), such as enacting the practice change
sought by activists (Eesley & Lenox, 2006;
Schwartz, 2010). Efforts to gauge such resource
commitments factor into more holistic efforts
to gauge economic, psychological, and social
costs (cf. Chen, Venkataraman, Sloan Black, &
MacMillan, 2002).
The implication for our theory is that managers
may evaluate activists’ prognostic scope to gauge
the internal costliness of change, contributing to
managers’ overall perceptions of the feasibility of
accommodating their rivals. Activists’ prognostic
claims appear to be costlier—and, consequently,
less feasible—to enact when managers perceive
the supply chain scope of practice change to be
increasing (cf. York, Vedula, & Lenox, 2018). Specifically, as practice change affects greater proportions of supply chains, such change also
becomes costlier to enact because it requires
firms to modify a wider variety of their own activities and to influence transaction partners at, or
beyond, the boundaries of their control. This effect
may intensify as the anticipated costs of practice
change extend beyond the costs of not changing.
Building on the preceding logic, we propose the
following.
Proposition 10: Managers’ perceptions
of activists’ prognostic scope negatively
relate to their perceptions of the feasibility of accommodating the practice
change proposed in activists’ claims.
Prognostic alignment describes managers’ evaluations of the compatibility between the practice
change proposed in activists’ claims and their firms’
defining qualities. Competitive dynamics and social activist researchers have recognized that firms’
defining qualities, as codified in organizational
identities, identity domains, value propositions,
and other constructs, shape the importance that
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managers assign to their firms’ contexts, offerings,
and activities (cf. York & Lenox, 2014). For instance,
managers view market contexts and organizational
practices that are more reflective of their firms’ organizational identities as more important to their
firms (Livengood & Reger, 2010). Research has
treated these attributions of importance as lenses
for managers to determine the salience of, and
threat posed by, rival actors such that rivals become more salient and threatening as they affect
more important organizational phenomena.
However, our theory contends that external
factors like the attributes of rivals and their
claims may shape managers’ salience and
threat perceptions, with internal factors like
firms’ defining qualities shaping managers’
feasibility perceptions. We suggest that in
shaping managers’ beliefs about the relative
importance of their firms’ practices, their firms’
defining qualities provide managers with a lens
to gauge the internal appropriateness of new
practices. When considered through the lens of
their firms’ defining qualities, practices become
more appropriate to managers as the practices
more strongly reinforce their firms’ defining
qualities (cf. Livengood & Reger, 2010). The implication for our theory is that managers may
evaluate activists’ prognostic alignment to
gauge the internal appropriateness of practice
change for their firms, contributing to the managers’ perceptions of the feasibility of accommodating their rivals’ prognostic claims.
Activists’ prognostic claims seem more appropriate—and, consequently, more feasible—to
enact when managers perceive more alignment
between the practice change sought by activists and their firms’ defining qualities. Building on the preceding logic, we propose the
following.
Proposition 11: Managers’ perceptions
of activists’ prognostic alignment positively relate to their perceptions of
the feasibility of accommodating the
practice change proposed in activists’
claims.

DISCUSSION
The purpose of this article was to conceptualize values-based rivalry between activists and
firms. We integrated and extended competitive dynamics and social activist research to
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construct a two-part theoretical framework of
values-based rivalry. The first part of our framework detailed the tensions, actions, and responses that characterize values-based rivalry,
including the ways values contribute to such rivalry. The second part of our framework attended
to firms’ likelihood of responding to rival activists’
claims during values-based rivalry, explaining
when firms make counterclaims. We established
the interplay among managers’ salience, threat,
and feasibility perceptions in shaping their
firms’ responses, as well as the mechanisms
through which activist-related attributes inform
each of these perceptions. Our framework
makes three primary contributions to competitive dynamics research, as well as associated
contributions to social activist research, with
each contribution offering additional insights
for those fields.
Establishing Activists As Rivals to Firms
First, our framework designates activists as rivals to firms, broadening the assumption in
competitive dynamics research about who constitutes a rival. In this research scholars have
typically conceptualized similar actors as rivals
(i.e., firms), yet our theory conceptualizes dissimilar actors as rivals (i.e., activists and firms). Our
broader conception of who constitutes a rival
emerges from our proposal that rivalry between
activists and firms reflects the core components of
rivalry, albeit in ways that differ from rivalry between firms. Defining rivals based on the core
components of rivalry, rather than on the types of
actors involved, creates a wealth of possibilities
for scholars to study rivalry between diverse
types of actors.
Viewing activists as rivals to firms also advances conceptualizations of activists in social
activist research. Such work has presented activists as altruistic, selfless actors destined to
remedy social and environmental injustices. Although this portrayal of activists holds merit, our
theory recognizes that activists may also exhibit
a rivalrous, self-interested side, as reflected in
their interconnected desires to secure control
over firms’ practices and to achieve supremacy
in values domains. This proposal coincides with,
and helps to explain why, activists’ efforts to
change firms’ practices are connected to activists’ efforts to achieve elevated social standing
relative to firms (Waldron et al., 2015).
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Specifying the Core Components of
Values-Based Rivalry
Second, our framework conceptualizes the core
components of rivalry as they uniquely pertain to
values-based rivalry, expanding competitive dynamics research’s conception of the tensions, actions, and responses that characterize rivalry
between firms. In terms of tension, competitive
dynamics researchers have posited that rival
firms experience tension when they seek to control the same consumers and resources and to
secure supremacy in product and factor markets,
pursuing commercial advantages in those settings (Capron & Chatain, 2008; Chen & Miller,
2015; Markman et al., 2009). We posit that rival
activists and firms experience tension when they
seek to control the firms’ practices and to secure
supremacy in values domains, pursuing social
advantages in those settings. This proposal underscores that the control sought by rivals can
extend beyond objects (e.g., consumers and
resources) to include behaviors for interacting
with those objects (e.g., practices for accessing
resources). Additionally, it recognizes that the
supremacy sought by rivals can take commercial and social forms, indicating that rivalry
can transcend the boundaries of traditional
product and factor markets to include sociocognitive markets, such as values domains. Finally, in establishing the reciprocity between
control and supremacy during rivalry, our proposal indicates that control does not necessarily
lead to supremacy.
In terms of actions and responses, competitive
dynamics researchers have recognized that firms’
actions and responses take the form of marketbased tactics designed to protect or secure favorable consumers and resources (Chen &
MacMillan, 1992; Chen & Miller, 2012; Smith
et al., 1997), facilitating supremacy in product and
factor markets. We posit that activists’ and firms’
actions and responses during values-based rivalry take the form of claims and counterclaims
designed to attach or avoid stigmatization and to
signify values to other actors, facilitating control
over practices and supremacy in values domains.
This proposal underscores that the nature of actions and responses used by rivals can extend
beyond what they do to include what they say.
Additionally, it establishes that actions and responses influence rivals not only by harming their
operations but also by potentially affecting their
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reputations. Finally, in conceptualizing that rivals’ claims signify their values to other actors in
values domains, our proposal underscores the
symbolic functionality of actions and responses,
extending attention to the substantive functionality of such behaviors.
Our proposals about the tensions, actions, and
responses in values-based rivalry also hold implications for social activist research. First, we
posit that tension between activists and firms
emanates from their pursuit of control over practices and supremacy in values domains, not only
the former (Briscoe & Gupta, 2016). Second, in
positing that activists and firms seek to secure
supremacy in values domains, we recognize that
rivalry between these actors is predicated on
more than mere differences in their values (Levy,
Reinecke, & Manning, 2016). Third, in positing
that activists’ and firms’ claims also signify
values to other actors in values domains, we recognize that such claims do more than disseminate
content about the firms’ practices (Guérard, Bode,
& Gustafsson, 2013). These contributions collectively offer insights to social activist research
about the core components of rivalry between
activists and firms, moving beyond examination of how one actor—activists—influences the
other—firms (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007).
Explicating the Role of Managerial Perception in
Values-Based Rivalry
Third, our framework conceptualizes the interplay among activist-related attributes, managers’
perceptions, and firms’ response likelihood during values-based rivalry, expanding competitive
dynamics research’s proposals about response
likelihood. In terms of the link between perceptions and response likelihood, competitive dynamics research has posited that the confluence
of AMC, as perceived by managers, shapes the
likelihood their firms will respond to rivals’ actions. We posit that the interplay of salience,
threat, and feasibility—contextualized specifications of AMC—constitutes managers’ perceptions
that shape their firms’ likelihood of responding
to activists’ claims during values-based rivalry.
This proposal acknowledges that although AMC
matters in any form of rivalry, salience, threat,
and feasibility may play a more direct role in
determining firm response likelihood during
values-based rivalry. It also underscores the
value of considering the interplay of managers’
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perceptions in facilitating firms’ response likelihood (Chen & Miller, 2012), rather than focusing on
the aggregate impact of managers’ perceptions
on such behavior (Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 2007).
Implicit is the notion that managers’ perceptions
independently and interconnectedly, rather than
aggregately, factor into their firms’ response
likelihood.
In terms of the link between attributes and
perceptions, competitive dynamics researchers
have recognized that attributes of rival firms and
their actions may influence managers’ AMC perceptions without conceptualizing these attributes
or the nature of their influence. We posit that attributes associated with activists’ reputed influence, diagnostic claims, and prognostic claims
distinctly shape managers’ perceptions of salience, threat, and feasibility, respectively. In
recognizing that managers consider activists’ influence over prior rival firms to determine the
salience of activists to their firms, this proposal
indicates that managerial sensemaking includes
rivalry in other settings, not only the rivalry their
firms are presently engaged in (Chen & Miller,
2012). Additionally, in recognizing that managers’
perceptions of threat and feasibility are predicated on activists’ prognostic and diagnostic
claims during rivalry, this proposal indicates that
managers consider what rivals say about their
own firms, not only what their rivals say about
themselves (Gao et al., 2017; Guo et al., 2017).
Our proposals about managerial perceptions and firm response likelihood also hold implications for social activist research. First, in
conceptualizing firms’ likelihood of responding to
activists’ claims during rivalry, we attend to the
nature of the exchanges that comprise rivalry
between activists and firms, moving beyond
the predominant emphasis on the outcomes of
such rivalry—namely, practice change (Briscoe &
Gupta, 2016; den Hond & de Bakker, 2007). Second,
our proposals about the impact of managers’
salience, threat, and feasibility perceptions on
their firms’ likelihood of responding to rival activists enrich extant proposals about the impact
of managers’ perceptions on their firms’ likelihood of practice change (Waldron et al., 2013).
Notably, conceptualizing the interplay between
these perceptions improves on the sensemaking processes proposed in prior research.
For instance, different from the proposal that
salience perceptions moderate threat perceptions (Waldron et al., 2013), we propose that
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managers must perceive rival activists to be
salient before evaluating the threat to their
firms. Third, our proposals about the activistrelated attributes that shape managers’ perceptions during values-based rivalry enrich extant
research that has looked at these internally
focused perceptions in isolation from the externally situated factors that may influence them
(McDonnell & King, 2013; Waldron et al., 2013).
Future Research
Our theoretical framework provides a robust
foundation for future research in the competitive
dynamics and social activist domains. Recognizing activists and firms as rivals provides the
impetus to study underexplored or unexpected
forms of rivalry, such as between activists, between politicians and firms, or between activists
and governments. Our framework relaxed the
assumption that rivalry occurs between firms
in product and factor markets, providing a template to elaborate the unique tensions, actions,
responses, and perceptions that characterize
other forms of rivalry. Additionally, attending to
the impact of managers’ perceptions on firms’
likelihood of responding to rival activists’ claims
informs further inquiry into the nature of the exchanges between these actors. One option is to
examine how the processes of rivalry between
activists and firms contribute to the outcomes
of such rivalry, considering the ongoing interplay among the two sides’ claims, counterclaims,
and perceptions. Other options include exploring scenarios where firms attempt to preempt
rivalry with activists, or where such rivalry may
influence firms’ current and subsequent interactions with traditional rivals in product and factor
markets. Finally, conceptualizing the impact of
activist-related attributes on managers’ perceptions of salience, threat, and feasibility provides
a starting point to conceptualize the impact of firmrelated attributes on these perceptions from the
activists’ perspective. It also provides a platform
to discern the contextual utility of the AMC and
salience, threat, and feasibility perspectives—the
two interconnected sets of managerial perceptions
at play during rivalry—in facilitating firm response likelihood, as well as to discern the external factors that shape perceptions during other
forms of rivalry. One option is to conceptualize the
firm-related attributes that influence these perceptions during rivalry between firms.
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CONCLUSION
Values-based rivalry is becoming more pervasive and influential. We created a theoretical
framework that conceptualizes the unique tensions, actions, and perceptions at play during
values-based rivalry, as well as the impact of
managers’ sensemaking efforts on their firms’
likelihood of responding to rival activists’ claims.
This framework marks an important step in the
theoretical evolution of the competitive dynamics
domain, which has progressed from explaining
rivalry in product and factor markets between
similar actors to explaining rivalry in sociocognitive markets between dissimilar actors. Our
intention is to spark further examination of this
phenomenon and to encourage competitive dynamics scholars to think more broadly and differently about rivalry, expanding the domain’s
theoretical and empirical horizons.
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